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This Comment examines the application of the public safety exception
to Miranda to cases of domestic terrorism, looking particularly at the case of
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. By comparing
the Department of Justice’s War on Terror policies to the Warren Court’s
rationale for Miranda, this Comment argues that courts should require law
enforcement officers to have reasonable knowledge of an immediate threat
to public safety before they may properly invoke the Quarles public safety
exception.
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INTRODUCTION
April 15, 2013. The finish line of the Boston Marathon, on the north
side of Boylston Street, on a beautiful spring day. 1 It is 2:49 in the
afternoon. The race clock reads 4:09:43.2 Suddenly, a boom “like a cannon”
erupts.3 Runners and spectators see a “ball of fire,” then smoke, glass,
debris.4 Thirteen seconds later, a second explosion rips through the crowd
five hundred feet away.5 There are people on the ground, limbs scattered,
blood everywhere.6 Three spectators lie dead, and nearly two hundred sixty
people are strewn, injured.7 Bombs made from two pressure cookers filled
with nails and shrapnel.8
April 18, 2013. The FBI is running a multiagency investigation into
the bombing.9 It releases images and descriptions of two suspects, soon
identified as Chechen-American brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev.10 In the pre-dawn hours of the next day, the same two men open
fire on a campus police officer on the campus of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology in Cambridge.11 They carjack an SUV at gunpoint across the
Charles River in Allston. A car chase and shootout with police in
Watertown follow, during which Tamerlan is killed.12 Dzhokhar escapes in
the stolen car.13

Christine Fennessy et al., What We Saw and How We Responded: An Oral History of
the 117th Boston Marathon, RUNNER’S WORLD, July 2013, at 70–90.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Press Release, FBI Boston, Remarks of Special Agent in Charge Richard DesLauriers
at Press Conference on Bombing Investigation (Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.
gov/boston/press-releases/2013/remarks-of-special-agent-in-charge-richard-deslauriers-atpress-conference-on-bombing-investigation-1, archived at http://perma.cc/L24S-8QT5. A
wide variety of federal, state, and local agencies contributed to the investigation, including
the Boston Police, ATF, Massachusetts State Police, and the more than thirty agencies of the
Joint Terrorism Task Force. Id.
10
Id.; Greg Botelho, Timeline: The Boston Marathon Bombing, Manhunt and
Investigation, CNN (May 2, 2013, 9:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/01/justice/
boston-marathon-timeline/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6W7-W789.
11
Botelho, supra note 10. The officer dies of his wounds. Id.
12
Id.
13
The Hunt for the Boston Bombing Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/19/us/boston-marathon-manhunt.html?ref=bostonmarathon
(last visited Mar. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7SJ6-YJ89.
1
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April 19, 2013. The entire Boston region is locked down for most of
the day. Residents are told not to leave their houses, as law enforcement
searches for the missing suspect.14 The lockdown is lifted at dusk. Shortly
thereafter, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is found bloody and weakened in a drydocked boat in a Watertown backyard. After a brief standoff, he is taken
into custody around 8 P.M.15 He is too injured to speak.16 With official
sanction from the Obama Administration, special counterterrorism agents
question, but do not Mirandize, Dzhokhar.17 Dzhokhar confesses to planting
the bombs with his brother.18 He is questioned in his hospital room for
sixteen hours over two days, before Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowles,
and two representatives from the U.S. Attorneys’ Office show up to
conduct a hearing. At this point, on April 22, 2013, Dzhokhar is finally read
his rights.19
Everyone with a television knows the famous words police officers
must say before they can question someone in custody: You have the right
to remain silent. If you give up that right, anything you say can and will be
used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you
can’t afford one, one will be appointed to you.20 Everyone knows these
protections as “Miranda rights.”21 But the Boston bombing aftermath
showed that, contrary to popular belief,22 these rights are not absolute.
Eric Schmitt et al., Bombing Inquiry Turns to Motive and Russia Trip, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2013, at A1.
15
The Hunt for the Boston Bombing Suspects, supra note 13.
16
Schmitt et al., supra note 14.
17
Id.
18
Rodrique Ngowi et al., Officials: Suspect Described Plot Before Miranda,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 25, 2013, 3:50 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/lawmakers-askwho-knew-what-about-bomb-suspect, archived at http://perma.cc/QRM7-E7DK.
19
Transcript of Initial Appearance Before the Honorable Marianne B. Bowler, United
States Magistrate Judge, on April 22, 2013 at 4–5, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13-cr10200 (D. Mass. Apr. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Tsarnaev Initial Appearance]; see also Emily
Bazelon, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Talked for 16 Hours Before He Was Read His Rights, SLATE
(Apr. 25, 2013, 2:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2013/04/dzhokhar_tsarnaev_s_interrogation_his_miranda_warning_shouldn_t_have_
taken.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XP8Q-CRSZ.
20
Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Hothouse (NBC television broadcast Jan. 13,
2009).
21
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22
See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHAT TO DO IF YOU’RE STOPPED BY POLICE,
IMMIGRATION AGENTS OR THE FBI, available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
aclu_kyr.pdf (failing to mention any exceptions to the Miranda rule in its instructions on
how to exercise one’s Miranda rights), archived at https://perma.cc/ZHQ9-3JED;
“Miranda” Rights and the Fifth Amendment, FindLaw, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminalrights/miranda-rights-and-the-fifth-amendment.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) (same),
14
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The Supreme Court has created a public safety exception to Miranda’s
broad language. In New York v. Quarles, the Court held that in some
situations presenting threats to public safety, the public’s interest in safety
outweighs an individual’s right to be informed of her Fifth Amendment
rights.23 In Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed that
defendants have the constitutional right to have these warnings read to
prevent self-incrimination, but it left intact the rule’s numerous
exceptions.24
Where the right ends and the public safety exception begins remains
elusive. Circuits are split as to how that exception should be interpreted and
what factual scenarios should properly trigger the exception. Approaches to
the public safety exception fall largely into two camps: the broad and the
narrow approaches to Quarles. Circuits following the broad approach allow
courts to admit evidence of prewarning statements made in inherently
dangerous situations, regardless of the immediacy or severity of the threat
to public safety. Those following the narrow approach admit such evidence
at trial only when law enforcement officers have actual knowledge of an
imminent threat to public safety.
This Comment advocates for the use of the narrow approach to the
public safety exception, even in terror contexts. By requiring officers to
have actual knowledge of an immediate threat to the public, the narrow
approach hews closely to the facts and reasoning of Quarles itself, and
allows both Miranda and its exception to coexist without the exception
consuming the rule. The Supreme Court should clarify that the Quarles
public safety exception applies only in narrow circumstances before another
person is potentially deprived of her constitutional rights. Our constitutional
democracy depends on the rule of law—or a match between the law as
written and the law as applied—for its legitimacy. Because Miranda is a
constitutional right,25 exceptions to its rule must be minimized as much as
possible, even if the rule has little effect on suspects’ behavior i I n practice.
Miranda is especially important as “a symbol of American commitment to
due process”26 in the terror context.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the history of the
Supreme Court’s confessions jurisprudence, exploring the reasons the
archived at http://perma.cc/E4UQ-L92U.
23
467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984).
24
530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
25
Id.
26
Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand for the
Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 763
(2011).
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Warren Court thought the rule necessary, and the Burger, Rehnquist, and
Roberts Courts’ gradual erosion of the rule. Part II examines the application
of Miranda and Quarles to the War on Terror. It argues that the narrow
approach to the public safety exception strikes an appropriate balance
between the needs of law enforcement and the individual rights of terror
suspects. Part III concludes by analyzing the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and showing how the narrow
approach to the public safety exception can still yield socially desirable
convictions.
I. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONFESSION LAW
A. THE ROAD TO MIRANDA

In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”27
Between the 1880s and the 1960s, courts held this to mean that a confession
was admissible only if it was “voluntary” and comported with due
process.28 The doctrinal underpinnings of the Court’s criminal
jurisprudence in the early-to-mid-twentieth century emphasized the
exceptionalism of American due process. It highlighted the contrast
between a truly democratic society and the totalitarian regimes of Europe,
and between free-willed individuals and the coercive state.29 The Court
contrasted unconstrained foreign police forces that were authorized to
“wring . . . confessions by physical and mental torture”30 with America’s
criminal justice system, which was based on “abstract, defendant-oriented
principles such as liberty, dignity, privacy, rationality, and freedom.”31

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 108 (2010); Bram v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 548 (1897); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1884). See also Charles J.
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1831 (1987); William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking
Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 816–17 (2005).
29
See David T. Hartmann, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda and the War on
Terror: Desperate Times Do Not Always Call for Desperate Measures, 22. GEO. MASON U.
C.R. L.J. 219, 224–25 (2012); Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal
Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 636 (2010).
30
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
31
Stephanos Bibas, The Rehnquist Court’s Fifth Amendment Incrementalism, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1078, 1081 (2006). See, e.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 46
(1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“We in this country . . . early made the choice—that the
dignity and privacy of the individual were worth more to society than an all-powerful
police.”); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943) (“A democratic society, in
27
28
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Police were required to use “fair procedures” in interrogating criminal
suspects for such confessions to be admissible in a court of law.32 Courts
considered the totality of the circumstances under which a confession was
extracted on a case-by-case basis.33 But this approach to voluntariness
proved a poor measure for rooting out unconstitutional conduct. By
proceeding on a case-by-case basis and by seeing only the most egregious
cases, the Court was unable to provide law enforcement with clear guidance
about what interrogation tactics were impermissible.34 These decisions
provided unsatisfactory guidance for lower courts about what the focus of a
“totality of the circumstances” analysis should be—the police tactics or the
characteristics of the suspect.35
Miranda is a landmark decision, not only for replacing courts’ due
process balancing test with a bright-line rule establishing protections for
suspects during custodial police interrogations, but also as an emblem of the
Warren Court’s expansive social and political vision. From 1953 to 1969,
when Earl Warren served as its Chief Justice, the Supreme Court took on
the role of the nation’s moral compass,36 seeking an emphasis on justice
rather than brute punishment.37 The Court’s decisions from this era—
whatever their context—share a common theme: the federal courts as
enforcers of individual rights and “equality norms” against the states.38
Even before Miranda, the Warren Court was particularly concerned
with the privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Frankfurter called the
privilege against self-incrimination “an important advance in the
development of our liberty” and “one of the great landmarks in man’s

which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the
law enforcement process.”).
32
McNabb, 318 U.S. at 347.
33
Id.
34
See Ogletree, supra note 28, at 1832–34.
35
See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed
It, How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 163–69 (2007);
see also Ogletree, supra note 28, at 1834–35.
36
See Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The
Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823, 834 (2012);
David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
845, 847 (2007).
37
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (requiring states to
provide legal counsel for felony defendants); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417 (1963)
(allowing federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that racial segregation of schools violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
38
Resnik, supra note 36, at 834.
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struggle to make himself civilized.”39 And two years before the Court
decided Miranda, Justice Goldberg’s opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commissioner of New York Harbor gave an elegant discourse on the right:
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will
be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates “a
fair state–individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load”; our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual “to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life,” our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the guilty,” is
often “a protection to the innocent.”40

It should not be surprising, then, that Chief Justice Warren’s expansive
reasoning in Miranda was grounded in preserving “human dignity” and
“individual liberty” against unjust police interrogation practices.41 With
these ideas engrained in the Warren Court’s jurisprudence, the stage was set
for the 1966 decision in Miranda.
B. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

Of all the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure decisions of the
twentieth century, Miranda v. Arizona42 is arguably the most well-known.
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion from June 1966 disposed of four
consolidated cases dealing with related issues of interrogations and

Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (citing ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE
5TH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted), overruled in part by United States v.
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (rejecting the generalized policy concerns underlying Murphy’s
holding; see also Bibas, supra note 31, at 1079–80 (discussing the Warren Court’s departure
from traditional Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence).
41
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455, 457 (1966); see also id. at 455–58 (discussing
contemporary police interrogation techniques); id. at 463–66 (drawing together themes from
self-incrimination precedents); id. at 468–69 (“The Fifth Amendment privilege is so
fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate
warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in
individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being
given. . . . More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at
the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the
individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.”).
42
Id. at 436.
39
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confessions.43 All four of the cases before the Court that day, including
namesake Ernesto Miranda’s, “share[d] salient features—incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights.”44 While the tactics used by law enforcement in each interrogation
might have passed muster under a traditional voluntariness analysis,45 the
Court required more, ultimately imposing on police an affirmative
obligation to adhere to certain “procedural safeguards” to ensure
individuals know their rights in order to ameliorate otherwise coercive
situations.46
The Court ultimately held that prior to questioning an individual in
custody, law enforcement agents must “[warn an individual] that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed.”47 The Court reasoned that police–citizen
interactions are inherently coercive, especially those conducted while the
citizen is in custody.48 Chief Justice Warren noted that, in order to protect
against such an environment, the Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination was not limited merely to the criminal courtroom; rather, the
protection extended to any situation in which a person’s “freedom of action
is curtailed in any significant way.”49 The Warren Court sought to
counterbalance the power of the state by strengthening the rights of the
individual. Rather than focus on reliability of a particular confession, as the
earlier voluntariness due process inquiry did, Miranda sought to protect the
individual liberty of all suspects in all inherently coercive environments.50
C. LIMITING MIRANDA

Although the Miranda decision seemed to give individuals more
protections during police interrogations, the Court has since limited the
Miranda doctrine and its liberal underpinnings. The decision’s expansive
view of an individual’s confession rights would not last much longer than
the Warren Court itself. Subsequent decisions in the 1970s, 1980s, and
Id. at 440.
Id. at 445.
45
Id. at 457.
46
Id. at 444–45.
47
Id. at 444.
48
Id. at 445–48.
49
Id. at 467.
50
See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (2010).
43
44
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1990s curtailed the Warren Court’s broad liberal vision in a “series of nieks
[sic] and cuts that, while not yet fatal, have led to critical blood loss.”51
In the Fourth Amendment context, evidence discovered through an
unconstitutional search or seizure must be excluded at trial.52 The
exclusionary rule is intended to deter government misconduct, incentivize
compliance with the strictures of the Constitution, and safeguard judicial
integrity.53 And yet the Rehnquist Court limited the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to Miranda violations, undercutting the value of this
constitutional right. For example, the Court held in Harris v. New York that
unwarned statements in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach the
defendant’s direct testimony at trial.54 Further, in United States v. Patane,
the Court declined to extend the full exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment to Miranda violations and held that the physical fruits of an
un-Mirandized defendant’s statements could still be admitted at trial.55
Moreover, the Court set a low bar by which to judge the adequacy of police
warnings by declining to require officers to recite Miranda’s warnings in
their entirety;56 made it easy for suspects in custody to waive their rights
under Miranda;57 and curtailed the duration and circumstances under which
officers must respect an invocation of rights under Miranda.58
Unique among Miranda’s progeny is one wholesale exception to the
Warren Court’s protections: New York v. Quarles, a 1984 decision written
by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist.59 Benjamin Quarles was charged with
possession of a weapon in the New York state courts.60 Late one night, a

Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1337 (2003); see also
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2626 (1996).
52
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
53
Id. at 656, 659.
54
401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
55
542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004).
56
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–03 (1989); id. at 203 (“[N]o talismanic
incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda]’s strictures.” (quoting California v. Prysock,
453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981)).
57
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1994) (holding that people
must unambiguously assert their Miranda rights); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,
373 (1979) (holding that a waiver of Miranda rights need not be explicit).
58
See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2010) (holding that an invocation
of the right to counsel ends after a fourteen-day break in custody); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 102–03 (1975) (holding that the invocation of the right to remain silent is not
indefinite).
59
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
60
Id. at 651.
51
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rape victim approached two police officers in Queens, New York, claiming
that the man who had assaulted her had gone, armed, into a nearby
supermarket.61 The officers entered the supermarket and quickly found the
man, Quarles, at the checkout counter and apprehended him. 62 One of the
officers handcuffed and frisked him, finding an empty gun holster on his
shoulder.63 Before Mirandizing Quarles, the officer asked him where the
gun was; Quarles gestured and said, “[T]he gun is over there.”64 Only after
the officer retrieved the gun did he read Quarles his Miranda rights, at
which point Quarles waived his right to remain silent and his right to an
attorney and consented to answer more questions.65 The trial court excluded
Quarles’s initial statement and the gun itself on the grounds that the officer
had questioned Quarles before reading him his rights, in violation of
Miranda.66 The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals both affirmed.67
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and carved out a “public
safety” exception to Miranda, holding that unwarned testimony from a
suspect in custody could be admitted into evidence in “situation[s] in which
police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the
public safety.”68 This exception applies regardless of the actual motivation
of the officers on the scene.69 Justice Rehnquist concluded that a threat to
public safety changes the balance between the social cost of respect for
individual dignity against the need for interrogation and conviction of guilty
suspects.70
Miranda warnings may deter suspects from answering questions,71
and, to Justice Rehnquist, this risk was unacceptable in cases where law
enforcement officers need to ask questions to get information to protect the

Id. at 651–52.
Id. at 652.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 652–53.
67
Id. at 653.
68
Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
69
Id. (“In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where
spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the day, the
application of the exception which we recognize today should not be made to depend on post
hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting
officer.”).
70
Id. at 657.
71
The Miranda majority conceded this risk. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479–
81 (1966). Criminological research over the last fifty years is inconclusive. See infra text
accompanying notes 151–155.
61
62
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public.72 A defendant’s refusal to answer questions in these circumstances
would not just mean the loss of evidence, Rehnquist reasoned; an officer
needs these questions answered to defuse any public safety risk.73 Justice
Rehnquist was clear that courts should defer to an officer’s intuition that a
certain situation presented a threat to public safety.74 Moreover, according
to the Justice, there is little risk that officers would take this exception too
far because “police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively
between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the
public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a
suspect.”75
Therefore, Quarles established that the public safety exception seems
to apply to anything a defendant said before being given Miranda warnings,
whether or not those admissions were related to the public safety issue.76 In
fact, the exception would apply whether or not there actually turned out to
be a true threat to public safety, so long as the reviewing court believed the
officer was trying to protect the public.77 However, the Quarles majority
was careful to distinguish acceptable prewarning questioning that was
related to a specific public safety threat from unacceptable prewarning
questions that were “clearly investigatory.”78 Thus, the public safety
exception applies when the police officer reasonably believes there is
danger to public safety, and any answers to questions related to that
reasonable fear asked before the Miranda warnings are given do not violate
Miranda and may be admitted at trial.
Justice Marshall dissented vigorously from any sanctioned exception
to Miranda:
The majority has lost sight of the fact that Miranda v. Arizona and our earlier
custodial-interrogation cases all implemented a constitutional privilege against selfincrimination. The rules established in these cases were designed to protect criminal
defendants against prosecutions based on coerced self-incriminating statements. The

Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 658–59.
76
Id. at 657–58.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 659 n.8 (distinguishing Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)). In Orozco, the
Court upheld suppression of un-Mirandized questioning about the location of a weapon. Id.
Justice Rehnquist noted in Quarles that the questions in Orozco “did not in any way relate to
an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger
associated with the weapon. In short there was no exigency requiring immediate action by
the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.” Id.
72
73
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majority today turns its back on these constitutional considerations, and invites the
government to prosecute through the use of what necessarily are coerced statements. 79

He believed that law enforcement could effectively do its job protecting the
public safety without an express exception that he believed eviscerated the
rights secured by Miranda: law enforcement officials can always ask
suspects whatever questions they deem necessary, but, according to Justice
Marshall, prosecutors should not be able to admit the resulting testimony at
trial.80 Justice Marshall argued that already-existing exceptions that
permitted courts to admit the fruits of unwarned testimony for various
purposes81 would still allow prosecutors to achieve convictions without
excising a whole class of cases from Miranda’s purview and devastating
the underlying Miranda rationale.82
In each of these cases undercutting Miranda, the Court justified its
holding by noting that Miranda did not announce a constitutional rule of its
own, but merely provided a prophylaxis to protect against violations of the
Fifth Amendment.83 “[A] prophylactic rule is a judicial work product
somehow distinguishable from judicial interpretation of the Constitution”
that “overenforces what the Constitution, as judicially interpreted, would
itself require.”84 Prophylactic rules, because they are not themselves part of
the Constitution, can be changed by statute or ordinary judicial decision;85
the Constitution’s provisions can only be amended by the procedures
established in Article V.86 It was not until 2000, in Dickerson v. United
States,87 that the Court finally affirmatively addressed Miranda’s status,
holding in a flawed88 opinion that Miranda is a constitutional right that
Id. at 680–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 686.
81
See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (permitting the use of unwarned
testimony for impeachment purposes at trial) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)
(imperfect Miranda warnings will not bar the use of a suspect’s testimony at trial where
statement was otherwise voluntary).
82
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The irony of the majority’s
decision is that the public’s safety can be perfectly well protected without abridging the Fifth
Amendment.”).
83
See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444 (“[T]hese procedural safeguards were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”).
84
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2004).
85
Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic Rules,” 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1 (2001).
86
U.S. CONST. art. V.
87
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
88
See Caminker, supra note 85, at 5 (noting that the Dickerson decision exhibits a “lack
of intellectual coherence”); Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s
79
80
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cannot be abrogated by Congress89 while punting on addressing the
inconsistencies between Miranda and cases like Quarles.90
But the important takeaway from Dickerson is that Miranda is a
constitutional rule—the “law as written” for the purposes of our
constitutional democracy.91 The rule of law fails and threatens the legality
of a state when there is a “gap” between the law as written and the law as
applied.92 “Stealth overruling”—whereby the Court claims to be following
precedent while in reality subtly chipping it away—exempts the Court from
its proper role in our tripartite democracy and threatens the legitimacy of
antimajoritarian judicial review.93 A principled approach to the
Constitution, seeking to give meaning to all of its guarantees, would
preserve Miranda’s protections and minimize the exceptions to their
application.
D. LOWER COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION

Lower courts disagree markedly over the scope of the public safety
exception. How important to the Quarles majority was it that the officer
asked “only the question necessary”94 to defuse the public safety risk before
informing Quarles of his rights? The Court gave no guidance as to how to
determine which questions are “necessary” to protect the public and which
might be merely helpful in a future prosecution. Similarly, it is unclear how
significant Justice Rehnquist’s inclusion of the phrase “on these facts” is to
the holding—a situation in which the officers on the scene specifically
knew the risk to public safety.95 Absent any further direction from the
Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 902 (2001) (arguing that “Dickerson could
have been written coherently—that the Court could have crafted other resolutions that would
have allowed it to harmonize its doctrine far more effectively than the skimpy, jerry-built
opinion the Court announced”); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV.
975, 976 (2001) (referring to Dickerson as an “opportunity missed” to make Miranda
jurisprudence coherent and effect real change).
89
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
90
Id. at 441.
91
See Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of Police Executives Toward
Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 929 (2007).
92
Id.
93
See Friedman, supra note 50, at 3–4; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare
Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1538 (2008)
(commenting on courts “purport[ing] to respect a precedent while in fact cynically
interpreting it into oblivion”).
94
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984).
95
Id. at 655. As Justice Marshall’s dissent shrewdly points out, the facts as recounted by
Justice Rehnquist differ markedly from those found by New York’s highest court. Id. at
675–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to that record, Quarles had been “reduced to a
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Supreme Court, circuit courts have been divided over what factual
circumstances are required to properly invoke Quarles.96
The First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits take a broad approach to the
public safety exception, admitting prewarning statements in inherently
dangerous situations, regardless of the immediacy or severity of the threat
to public safety.97 These circuits do not require that officers have actual
knowledge of weapons or other threats, only that the questions they ask of
the suspect be “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”98
Threats to public safety may include threats only to police officers who are
acting in the course of their job.99 These courts may admit evidence
resulting from prewarning questioning whenever there is an “objectively
reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate
danger,”100 such as asking an arrestee whether he had drugs or needles on
his person that might hurt an officer during a bodily search,101 asking a
drunk man if he had a gun on his person in an area filled with bars and

condition of physical powerlessness” by the time police officers questioned him about his
gun. Id. at 675 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the opinion below in the Court of Appeals
of New York, 444 N.E.2d 984 (N.Y. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For the
purposes of this Comment, I will accept the majority’s account of the facts, which does not
affect my arguments below.
96
See Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, Strange Bedfellows: How Expanding the Public
Safety Exception to Miranda Benefits Counterterrorism Suspects, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1,
10 (2013); Keith A. Petty, A Different Kind of Criminal? Miranda, Terror Suspects, and the
Public Safety Exception, 4 ELON L. REV. 175, 181–82 (2012); Rorie A. Norton, Comment,
Matters of Public Safety and the Current Quarrel over the Scope of the Quarles Exception to
Miranda, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1947–60 (2010).
97
Norton, supra note 96, at 1948. See, e.g., United States v. Watters, 572 F.3d 479, 482–
83 (8th Cir. 2009) (permitting questioning of a suspect to locate a gun he “might have
hidden” on a street busy with bars); United States v. Fox, 393 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2004)
(allowing an officer to question a suspect because of a visible “bulge” in his pocket),
vacated, 545 U.S. 1125 (2005) (remanding for further consideration in light of the Court’s
opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)); United States v. Reilly, 224 F.3d
986, 992 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he exception was properly applied because there existed an
objectively reasonable need for the officer to protect himself from potential bodily harm.”).
98
United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Lawrence, 952 F.2d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord
Watters, 572 F.3d at 483; Fox, 393 F.3d at 60; Reilly, 224 F.3d at 992.
99
See, e.g., United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 2008) (allowing
officers to question a suspect before Mirandizing him even though they had already
handcuffed the suspect and seized his gun because they “had good reason to be concerned
that additional weapons might pose a threat to their safety”).
100
See, e.g., United States v. Carillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884, 888 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101
Id.
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people,102 or asking a suspect if he was armed in a case where officers had
not yet secured the surrounding area.103
On the other hand, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
take a narrow approach,104 admitting prewarning admissions and evidence
only when law enforcement officers have actual knowledge of an imminent
threat to public safety. This
exception applies only where there is “an objectively reasonable need to protect the
police or the public from any immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.” Absent
such circumstances posing an objective danger to the public or police, the need for the
exception is not apparent, and the suspicion that the questioner is on a fishing
expedition outweighs the belief that public safety motivated the questioning that all
understand is otherwise improper.105

These courts have upheld admissions when the suspects were asked
about guns when they were arrested during a drug deal106 and when officers
saw a magazine of semiautomatic weapons and ammunition when they
entered a suspect’s home to arrest him,107 but not when the suspect was
already in custody and his gun was hidden in a place to which the public
had access.108 The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Raborn drew a
distinction between a case like Quarles, in which the gun was likely on the
defendant’s person and in his control, and a case like the one before them,
in which the gun was easily accessible to and within the control of the
police.109

Watters, 572 F.3d at 482–83.
Reilly, 224 F.3d at 992.
104
Norton, supra note 96, at 1948. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 153–
54 (2d Cir. 2003) (allowing questioning of a suspect who was known to carry a gun when he
was arrested in the afternoon near a school); United States v. Lackey, 334 F.3d 1224, 1227
(10th Cir. 2003) (permitting officers to ask a “focused question” that implicated the safety of
the officer and bystanders); United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2001)
(permitting an officer to ask a suspect about the presence of a gun after the officer had seen
ammunition and a magazine in plain sight); United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 693 (4th
Cir. 1994) (“Mobley was encountered naked; by the time he was arrested, the FBI already
had made a security sweep of his premises, and they had found that he was the sole
individual present, and that the apartment was a residence for Mobley alone”); United States
v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the public safety exception does
not apply to a suspect’s truck, where only officers had access).
105
Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984))
(emphasis added).
106
Reyes, 353 F.3d at 153–54.
107
Talley, 275 F.3d at 564.
108
Raborn, 872 F.2d at 595.
109
Id.
102
103
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In one of the more pertinent cases—Justice Marshall’s proverbial
“ticking time bomb” scenario110—the Second Circuit held in United States
v. Khalil that a defendant’s prewarning statements were correctly admitted
under the public safety exception.111 In that case, upon information that an
informant’s two roommates had built bombs and intended to detonate them
in the New York City subway, police raided a Brooklyn apartment. They
found two men and a black bag, which turned out to contain pipe bombs
with their switches flipped.112 A gunfight ensued, putting both men in the
hospital.113 Police questioned one of the defendants, Gazi Ibrahim Abu
Mezer, in the hospital almost immediately, out of concern that the bomb
would detonate before they could disarm it. In doing so, the officers asked
questions only directly related to the weapons: the number of bombs, how
to disarm them, and whether they were attached to timers.114 Abu Mezer
answered all of these questions.115 Officers also asked Abu Mezer whether
he had planned to kill himself, to which he answered, “Poof.”116 The
District Court admitted these hospital statements in their entirety, rejecting
Abu Mezer’s argument that “Poof” was unrelated to the public safety.117
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that even if “Poof” did not fit within
the public safety exception, its admission was merely harmless error.118
This case fits within the Second Circuit’s narrow approach to Quarles
because the questioning officers asked questions related only to their actual
knowledge of the bombs.
The difference between the broad and narrow interpretations of the
Quarles public safety exception, while admittedly sometimes negligible,
has the potential to overwhelm Miranda itself and render the rule

110
In his Quarles dissent, Justice Marshall argued that a public safety exception was
unnecessary because police are always free to disregard Miranda if they think it necessary—
prosecutors would just be unable to admit the defendant’s unwarned testimony at trial.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall gave the example of “a
bomb . . . about to explode” as the quintessential situation in which the public is seriously
imperiled enough to justify ignoring constitutional rights (thereby implying that a gun may
or may not be sufficient). Id. Yet, Justice Marshall still believed that the state should pay the
consequences of inadmissibility if officers asked defendants questions in custody without
delivering Miranda warnings. Id.
111
United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2000).
112
Id. at 115.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 116, 121.
118
Id. at 122.
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meaningless. The difference between the broad and narrow approaches may
mean the difference between admission (using the former approach) and
suppression (using the latter) of testimony in cases like that of Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev. As one commentator has noted, “[I]n its most permissive posture,
the [public safety exception] will admit testimony in response to any
question that could have been intended to secure public safety—even if the
question was asked with the motive to incriminate or if there was never any
actual public safety threat.”119 Absent better guidance as to when and how
the public safety exception may be properly invoked, the exception
threatens to consume the rule and render Miranda virtually meaningless.
II. THE WAR ON TERROR
The scope of the public safety exception to Miranda has great
significance in the prosecution of domestic terrorism in the U.S. civilian
criminal justice system. The Obama Administration’s policy of prosecuting
domestic terrorists in civilian courts,120 rather than as enemy combatants
before military tribunals like the Bush White House did,121 means the space
between the broad and narrow approaches to Quarles is a distinction with a
real difference. Now that we speak of terrorism in the language of “crime”
and not “war,” it should be treated, academically and procedurally, in the
same way as other crimes.122 The public safety exception to Miranda can,
and should, apply to suspected terrorists just as it does to any other
suspected criminal.123 Because terrorists are now tried in civilian courts,
their fates will often turn on what information will be excluded or admitted
at trial, which in turn depends on the breadth of the public safety exception.
Procedural protections like Miranda are particularly important when the
death penalty is on the line—which 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a), use of weapons of
mass destruction, carries. It is critical to ensure the legitimacy of our
constitutional democracy in the ideologically-freighted environment of
terrorism in the United States.124

Joanna Wright, Comment, Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of the
Public Safety Exception, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1296, 1308 (2011).
120
Petty, supra note 96, at 184 & nn.62–63.
121
See M. Katherine B. Darmer, Miranda Warnings, Torture, the Right to Counsel and
the War on Terror, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 631, 631 (2007).
122
See Amos N. Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda and Counterterrorism,
71 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (2011); see Hartmann, supra note 29, at 235–41.
123
A discussion of Miranda’s application in other executive branch–run coercive
environments—for example, Guantanamo and other black box sites—is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
124
See Margulies, supra note 26, at 731.
119
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A. THE OCTOBER 2010 FBI MEMO

Unless and until the Supreme Court clarifies the proper boundaries of
the public safety exception, law enforcement officials at the state and
federal levels have almost free reign to question whomever, whenever and
however they see fit, so long as there is at least some minimal post-hoc
public safety justification. The lack of clarity in this area threatens our
rights and the legitimacy of our constitutional democracy.
A perfect example of the dangers of this uncertainty is manifest in an
unsigned memorandum from the FBI and the Department of Justice, dated
October 21, 2010, and published by the New York Times in March 2011.125
Citing Quarles, the memo instructs agents to question un-Mirandized
suspects about anything “reasonably prompted by an immediate concern for
the safety of the public or the arresting agents.”126 The memo further
advises that officers may ask questions beyond the immediate threat if
“valuable and timely intelligence” may be recovered from the suspect.127
The memo rationalizes that the intelligence and security issues specific
to terrorism justify these extraordinary measures.128 Agents are instructed to
seek approval for extra-Miranda questioning from FBI headquarters, the
Department of Justice, or the Office of General Counsel when there is
time.129 The memo, however, leaves final discretion with the agents on the
scene, who can assess “all the facts and circumstances” and make a
determination regarding when to Mirandize an arrestee “on a case-by-case
basis.”130 The memo suggests areas of unwarned questioning that should be
broached prior to warning: “questions about possible impending or
coordinated terrorist attacks; the location, nature, and threat posed by
weapons that might post an imminent danger to the public; and the
identities, locations, and activities or intentions of accomplices who may be
plotting additional imminent attacks.”131

Internal Memorandum from Fed. Bureau of Investigation on Custodial Interrogation
for Public Safety and Intelligence-Gathering Purposes of Operational Terrorists Inside the
United States (October 21, 2010) [hereinafter Internal FBI Memorandum], available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda-text.html?_r=0,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/NLW2-9ZKL; see Charlie Savage, Delayed Miranda Warning Ordered for
Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at A17.
126
Internal FBI Memorandum, supra note 125.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
125
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In practical terms, this memo authorizes FBI agents to ask almost
anyone suspected of terrorism any question. This approach is problematic:
“Using the doctrine to justify questioning suspects in non-emergency
situations amounts to a deliberate end-run around the Miranda rule.”132
Dickerson made clear that legislative attempts to evade Miranda are
unconstitutional; it is unclear why an executive evasion would be any less
problematic. Although the memo lacks the precedential value of statutory
or common law, it reveals the executive branch’s views on Miranda and,
until challenged in the courts, it reveals the way law enforcement officers
are likely to be trained to approach interrogating suspects.
The memo was likely an internal response to two unrelated domestic
terrorism incidents: the failed bombing of an international Northwest
Airlines flight on Christmas Day 2009,133 and the attempted car bombing of
Times Square on May 1, 2010.134 In the first, a young Nigerian man, Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, was taken into FBI custody immediately upon
landing in Michigan after the bomb he was wearing on board failed to
detonate and instead started a small fire in the cabin.135 Recent interviews
with the local FBI agents who questioned him before he was Mirandized,
nine hours after being taken into custody, reveal the wealth of confessions
he made—the type of bomb, that he was affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and that
he was acting alone.136 After less than an hour of questioning, officers
realized Abdulmutallab was under the influence of some type of medication

132
Joe Palazzolo & Tammy Audi, ‘Public Safety’ Exception to Miranda Warnings Arises
in LAX-Shooting Case, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Nov. 7, 2013, 4:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2013/11/07/public-safety-exception-to-miranda-warnings-arises-in-lax-shootingcase (quoting defense lawyer Justine Harris) (internal quotation marks omitted), archived at
http://perma.cc/632L-MA3Y.
133
See Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Says Plane Passenger Tried to Detonate
Device, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at A1.
134
See Mark Mazzetti et al., Terrorism Suspect, Charged, Admits to Role in Bomb Plot,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A1.
135
O’Connor & Schmitt, supra note 133 (misstating the given name of the bombing
suspect as “Abdul Farouk Abdulmutallab”); see Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror
Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES (updated Jan. 19, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html (correcting the error), archived at
http://perma.cc/YV5S-FDJ7.
136
See Scott Lewis, Exclusive: FBI Agents Reveal Underwear Bomber Abdulmutallab
Wore Explosive Underwear for Three Weeks, ABC 7 WXYZ DETROIT (Sept. 27, 2012, 4:03
PM),
http://www.wxyz.com/dpp/news/local_news/investigations/fbi-agents-underwearbomber-abdulmutallab-wore-underwear-for-3-weeks, archived at http://perma.cc/7WJZ7DPH; Walter Pincus, Bomb Suspect Was Read Miranda Rights Nine Hours After Arrest,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, at A6.
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and broke to allow the medication to wear off.137 Once the interrogation
resumed, Abdulmutallab became far less talkative, at which point he was
read his Miranda rights.138 In the end, Abdulmutallab pled guilty to the
eight federal terrorism-related charges brought against him, so we will
never know whether the Michigan federal judge would have admitted his
unwarned admissions.139
Republican legislators were outraged that the Obama Administration
chose to try Abdulmutallab in a civilian court and that President Obama
directed FBI officers at the scene to read him his Miranda rights so soon.140
Before the furor could die away, news broke of a second foiled domestic
terrorist plot just months later. On May 1, 2010, a car bomb was discovered
in a parked SUV in Times Square in Manhattan.141 Law enforcement
identified Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen from Pakistan.142
He was arrested at John F. Kennedy Airport trying to flee to Dubai.143 FBI
agents questioned him for three or four hours before Mirandizing him; he
waived his rights and continued cooperating, admitting that he had been
trained in explosives in Pakistan and was working alone.144 Shahzad, too,
eventually pled guilty to his charges.145
A week after the Shahzad incident, Attorney General Eric Holder went
on the record on Meet the Press to say that the Obama Administration
would “seek a law allowing investigators to interrogate terrorism suspects

Opinion, Abdulmutallab in 50 Minutes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2010, at A16.
Id. It is worth noting that it appears there is some confusion over the exact timeline;
some reports suggest that Abdulmutallab may have stopped cooperating before he was read
his Miranda rights. See, e.g., Pincus, supra note 136.
139
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Sentenced to Life
in Prison for Attempted Bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 (Feb. 16, 2012),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-sentenced-lifeprison-attempted-bombing-flight-253-christmas-day, archived at https://perma.cc/5TZW8MWM?type=source.
140
See Pincus, supra note 136; Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Details of
Terror Arrest Emerge, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A1.
141
Al Baker & Karin Henry, Car Bomb Leads to Evacuation in Times Square, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 2010, at A1.
142
Mazzetti et al., supra note 134.
143
Id.
144
Id.; see Michael B. Mukasey, Opinion, Shahzad and the Pre-9/11 Paradigm, WALL
ST. J., May 12, 2010, at A19; Charlie Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at A1.
145
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Manhattan
Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes Arising from Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square
(June 21, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-ag-721.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/SX9D-YRKB?type=source.
137
138
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without informing them of their rights.”146 A handful of Miranda-related
bills were proposed in the 111th Congress, including measures to prohibit
using authorized funds to provide Miranda warnings to foreign nationals
suspected of terrorist activity147 and a proposal that would prohibit the use
of Miranda and related warnings in new “procedures relating to high-value
detainees.”148 Neither of these proposals gained serious traction, nor is it
likely that one will, given the general consensus that the public safety
exception is flexible enough to effectively aid law enforcement in most
situations.149 But the FBI memo shows that the executive branch has taken
it upon itself to push the boundaries of the public safety exception,150
further widening the gap between the law as written (Miranda) and the law
as applied, and threatening the rule of law at home.
B. MIRANDA, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Critics argue that because Miranda has the potential to deter criminal
defendants’ confessions, it is especially inappropriate in the sensitive
national security context of the War on Terror. Scholars disagree, however,
about the extent to which Miranda has a negative “social cost” on the
criminal justice system generally and law enforcement practice in
particular.151 The general consensus is “that Miranda has had relatively
little effect on law enforcement.”152 Some studies indicate that “even when
Miranda warnings are properly administered many suspects still choose to
waive their rights,”153 but other studies point in the other direction. One
quantitative study examined the number of confessions and convictions lost
because suspects refused to cooperate once they were Mirandized. This
study concluded that “Miranda has led to lost cases against almost four
Savage, supra note 144.
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41252, TERRORISM, MIRANDA, AND
RELATED MATTERS 8–10 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41252.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/NK7Y-H7YE.
148
Id. at 9.
149
Id. See also Joanna Wright, Applying Miranda’s Public Safety Exception to Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev: Restricting Criminal Procedure Rights by Expanding Judicial Exceptions,
113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 136, 147 (2013).
150
See Savage, supra note 125.
151
Compare Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1, 17 (1986), with Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical
Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 438 (1996).
152
White, supra note 151, at 17.
153
Petty, supra note 96, at 187. See also George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1999 (2004); SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE
SOC’Y, AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 28 (1988).
146
147
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percent of all criminal suspects in this country who are questioned.”154
While this statistic sounds small, in the aggregate this could mean an
unacceptably high number of criminals have been set free.155
Whatever Miranda’s social cost in the ordinary criminal context, it is
obvious that there may be a special cost to using Miranda in terrorist
interrogations: a criminal conviction is not the government’s only interest in
these situations. In any terrorist interrogation, there is always a tension
between two national security interests: “(1) neutralizing the current
terrorist threat and (2) gathering intelligence in order to neutralize future
terrorist threats.”156 In fact, some commentators, politicians, and
practitioners argue that because of the “heightened level of criminality”157
of terrorists, Miranda should be abandoned altogether.158
It is true that “[d]elaying Miranda warnings in order to gain
information that could prevent a terror attack is a considerable public
interest.”159 But that does not mean that Miranda needs to be changed for
the War on Terror. Coupling Miranda with the public safety exception, one
study concluded Miranda poses no special issues for interrogating
suspected terrorists, arguing that “the [public safety exception] deftly
balances Miranda’s constitutional safeguards with public safety,
extinguishing any need for legislation revoking suspected terrorists’
Miranda warnings, a constitutional right crucial to ensuring procedural due
process.”160 In fact, David Kris, a former Assistant Attorney General for
National Security at the Department of Justice, notes that intelligence
gathered from Mirandized testimony is only slightly less effective than
unwarned testimony.161 Quarles alone can account for the special interests
of a terrorist interrogation as both an intelligence-gathering tool and a
source of evidence in a criminal prosecution. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
declared that the public safety exception “will be circumscribed by the

Cassell, supra note 151, at 438.
See id.
156
David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L.
& POL’Y 1, 72 (2011).
157
Petty, supra note 96, at 186.
158
Eric Posner, The New Law We Need in Order to Deal with Dzhokhar Tsarnaev,
SLATE (Apr. 22, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_
from_chicago/2013/04/dzhokhar_tsarnaev_and_the_law_authorize_the_isolation_and_
detention_of_suspected.html (arguing in favor of a new law authorizing the isolation and
detention of suspected terrorists), archived at http://perma.cc/E747-NBX9.
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Petty, supra note 96, at 186.
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Wright, supra note 119, at 1300.
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See Kris, supra note 156, at 74.
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exigency which justifies it.”162 If a terror suspect really poses a higher risk
than a run-of-the-mill criminal does, then our interrogation-confession
doctrine, as narrowly construed by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits, can accommodate that.
The debate over Miranda and the War on Terror has only intensified in
the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing. Popular media has been
filled with commentary about Miranda, the public safety exception, its
origins, and its scope.163 Some legal scholars have called for a robust public
safety exception whenever there might be a “ticking-bomb scenario.”164
Others have argued that “[w]hen the law gets bent out of shape for
[Tsarnaev], it’s easier to bend out of shape for the rest of us,”165 and that
“[i]t appears to be DOJ policy to consider invoking the public-safety
exception whenever possible to gather information or intelligence.”166
There is a plethora of informed, persuasive, and even contradictory,
opinions out there. Much of the confusion surrounding acts of terror and
Miranda rights comes down to which circumstances justify an invocation of
Quarles.167
In many ways, we are back in the world in which Miranda and its
predecessors were decided: one pitting the discourses of democracy,
individualism, and liberty against totalitarianism and extremism. The
individual rights values underlying the Warren Court’s decisions are
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984).
See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Why Should I Care That No One’s Reading Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev His Miranda Rights?, SLATE (Apr. 19, 2013, 11:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/04/dzhokhar_tsarnaev_and_miranda_
rights_the_public_safety_exception_and_terrorism.html, archived at http:// perma.cc/BT2TYBVW.
164
Akhil Reed Amar, What if Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Decides Not to Talk?, SLATE (Apr. 22,
2013, 4:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/04/if_
dzhokhar_tsarnaev_decides_not_to_talk_the_police_should_be_allowed_to.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/H28B-GTMB.
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Bazelon, supra note 163.
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Palazzolo & Audi, supra note 132 (quoting Northwestern University School of Law
professor and former federal prosecutor Juliet Sorensen) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Compare Bill Chappell, Miranda Rights and Tsarnaev: Ex-U.S. Attorney General
Weighs In, NPR (April 21, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/04/
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relevant again today and should not be ignored. One commentator has
argued that “exploiting constitutional exceptions vis-à-vis terror suspects
signals to terrorists that their actions are successful at forcing us to dilute
civil liberties.”168 Others have questioned the legitimacy of a government
that acts against the “fundamental rights of the people as well as the rule of
law.”169 Expanding the public safety exception beyond the bounds
suggested by Quarles and into the broad approach—or worse, allowing the
executive to unilaterally announce constitutional policy in the form of an
FBI memorandum—is exactly that kind of illegitimate action.
The unfortunate truth is that domestic terrorism shows no sign of
disappearing—in fact, people like Abdulmutallab, Shahzad, Tsarnaev,
James Holmes of Aurora, Colorado,170 and Paul Ciancia (at Los Angeles
International Airport171) will continue to attempt terrorist acts around the
country.172 The extent of the public safety exception to the requirement that
individuals be provided with certain inalienable rights is a serious dilemma.
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance to the contrary, the most
principled way to deal with this exception is to contain it as narrowly as
possible and protect the rule of law by complying with the letter of Miranda
as far as possible. By requiring officers to have reasonable knowledge of an
immediate threat to the public, the narrow approach hews closely to the
facts and reasoning of Quarles itself,173 and it allows both Miranda and
Quarles to coexist without one overwhelming the other.

Petty, supra note 96, at 185.
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE STATE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES: ONE YEAR LATER
1, available at http://ccrjustice.org/v2/reports/docs/Civil_Liberities.pdf (last visited Feb. 22,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8B8L-35M4.
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See Jennifer Brown et al., “Our Hearts Are Broken”, DENVER POST, at A1. In 2012,
Holmes killed twelve moviegoers at a midnight premiere of Batman: The Dark Knight Rises
with gas canisters, an assault weapon, and two other firearms. Id.
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See Palazzolo & Audi, supra note 132. In November 2013, Ciancia opened fire with
an assault weapon in Los Angeles International Airport, shooting three Transportation
Security Agency (TSA) agents and one civilian around the airport terminal before airport
police stopped him. Greg Botelho & Dan Simon, LAX Suspect Shot TSA Officer, Walked
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(defining terrorism broadly as “any serious violent or property crime committed to advance a
particular ideology”).
173
Again, assuming that the facts of Quarles are as the Supreme Court majority
recounted.
168
169

3. LONKY (JWM Final)

2017]

7/3/2017 9:02 AM

MIRANDA & BOSTON

417

III. DZHOKHAR TSARNAEV AND THE 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING
Some commentators argue that the public safety exception, used
expansively with regard to terrorists, presents no constitutional problems
because it does nothing not already sanctioned by the Supreme Court.174
And technically, they might be correct—one could argue that the October
2010 FBI/DOJ memo is simply an extreme version of the broad approach to
Quarles followed by the First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. But after the
Court held in Dickerson that Miranda is a constitutional right that cannot be
abrogated by the legislature, it makes no sense for the executive branch to
be allowed to virtually obliterate that same right. The interrogation of
terrorists fits within the coercive paradigm Miranda sought to remedy,175
and if Miranda still means anything for civil liberties, it needs to be
invoked in the situations it was designed to remedy—especially when those
suspects, like Faisal Shahzad and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, are American
citizens.
America can still improve its anti-terrorism security under the
framework of the narrow public safety exception, which requires officers to
have actual knowledge of an imminent threat to public safety. Any
testimony in a true “ticking time bomb” scenario could be admitted, like in
United States v. Khalil; anything less would be excluded, under the Warren
Court’s vision of criminal law, as a fishing expedition. Adherence to the
rule of law requires a circumscribed application of the public safety
exception such that Miranda is as fully realized in reality as it appears on
paper. The narrow approach follows the reasoning of Quarles itself,
allowing both doctrines to coexist without one overwhelming the other. The
Supreme Court should clarify that the application of the exception is
extremely narrow in all public safety situations.
When Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was apprehended on April 19, four days
after the bombs detonated on Boylston Street, he was practically
incapacitated and in dire need of medical care to address gunshot
wounds.176 The next day, on April 20, FBI agents questioned Tsarnaev in
the hospital, although he was unable to speak due to his injuries and had to

See Petty, supra note 96, at 186.
See Guiora, supra note 122, at 1150–51; see also Ryan T. Williams, Stop Taking the
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respond in writing.177 It was not until Monday, April 22, a week after the
bombing and after sixteen hours of interrogation, that Magistrate Judge
Marianne B. Bowler read Tsarnaev his rights during a bedside special court
appearance.178
Regardless of the time medical attention would take, the Department
of Justice was clear immediately after officers arrested Tsarnaev that it
would be invoking the public safety exception to question him in the
hospital before reading him his rights.179 Unlike the other suspects
discussed above, Tsarnaev did not plead guilty to the charges and
proceeded to trial in March 2015.180 Since Tsarnaev was charged in the
District of Massachusetts, it is likely that his unwarned testimony would
have been admitted at trial under Quarles if it had been offered into
evidence, since the First Circuit follows the broad approach to the public
safety exception. But if confronted with that evidence, the District Court
should not have admitted Tsarnaev’s confession.
Under the narrow approach, Tsarnaev’s medical status should have
made clear that there was no immediate threat to law enforcement officers
or the public—he was captured in a dry-docked boat in a Boston backyard
after suffering significant blood loss and admitted to a local hospital in
“serious” condition.181 And even if his activities (involving a bomb, a car
chase, a shootout) of the previous few days prompted a reasonable concern
for public safety, it should have become clear almost immediately that once

See Bazelon, supra note 19; Pete Williams et al., Badly Wounded Boston Marathon
Bombing Suspect Responding to Questions, NBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2013, 7:53 AM), http://
usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/21/17848814-badly-wounded-boston-marathonbombing-suspect-responding-to-questions?lite, archived at http://perma.cc/VQ3M-J9EJ;
Ngowi et al., supra note 18.
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TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 19, 2013, 10:18 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/
livewire/doj-official-no-miranda-rights-for-boston-bombing-suspect-yet, archived at http://
perma.cc/H2CS-SKTM; Amy Davidson, What Happened to the Miranda Warning in
Boston?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/
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Tsarnaev was in police custody, no further threat existed. At most, law
enforcement needed a few hours to defuse the threat and discover other
weapons or co-conspirators, not days. Tsarnaev’s case is about as different
from Quarles as can be—there was no knowledge of weapons on the scene;
there was no physical struggle; and officers had days, not minutes, to plan
their questioning.182
Miranda and its requirements should have applied when officers first
found and questioned Tsarnaev because he was clearly subject to a
custodial interrogation. Using the narrow interpretation of the public safety
exception, Tsarnaev should have been warned of his rights before
questioning, and since he was not, any statements given before Judge
Bowles read him his rights should have been excluded at his trial. The
officers on the scene had no actual knowledge of an imminent threat, and
any threat of a second bombing incident could arguably have been
uncovered as easily by officers legally searching the Tsarnaev brothers’
apartment and questioning friends, family, and neighbors as by questioning
an injured suspect, Tsarnaev, who was unable to speak and in intensive
medical care. In fact, as in most cases, the FBI still had plenty of other
inculpatory evidence to obtain a conviction without needing to admit an unMirandized confession.183 The court system could have had its cake and
have eaten it, too, following the narrow approach: it would have been able
to respect Tsarnaev’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination while
still obtaining the conviction of a dangerous criminal. In cases where the
death penalty is on the line,184 the utmost care should be taken to observe
each and every protection the Constitution affords.
CONCLUSION
The Warren Court had lofty visions when it decided Miranda in 1966.
It sought to uphold the civil liberties of the individual, minimize the
coercive power of the state, and make the American criminal justice system
a beacon of liberty and integrity in the Cold War. The Quarles public safety
exception seriously jeopardizes that vision, and expansions of the exception
with regards to the War on Terror threaten it even further. Our
constitutional democracy depends on the rule of law for its legitimacy.
See Wright, supra note 149, at 138.
See Ngowi et al., supra note 18.
184
Tsarnaev was ultimately found guilty of all 30 charges against him at trial, and the
jury imposed the death penalty for six of 17 capital counts. Verdict at 1-32, United States v.
Tsarnaev, No. 1:13-cr-10200 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2015), ECF No. 1261; Penalty Phase Verdict
at 21-22, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13-cr-10200 (D. Mass. May 15, 2015), ECF No.
1434.
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Because Miranda is a constitutional right, exceptions to its rule must be
minimized as much as possible. The only principled way to deal with the
inconsistencies between Miranda and Quarles is to contain the public
safety exception as narrowly as possible, following the approach adopted
by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, until the Supreme
Court gives further guidance. As the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev shows, the
narrow approach can simultaneously ensure constitutional rights, protect
immediate public safety, and permit successful prosecution of criminal
activity.

